Take Five: Modi Feels the Heat

A selection of the major stories impacting ESG investors, in five easy pieces. 

Climate wasn’t high on the ballot in India’s election, but Modi must soon face uncomfortable truths on coal.

Modi feels the heat – Conducted in record temperatures, the world’s biggest exercise in democracy dealt a blow to the ego of incumbent Prime Minister Narendra Modi, but it’s less clear how the outcome of India’s general election will impact its net zero transition. Stock prices were down this week on the assumption that reliance on coalition partners would slow the pace of the infrastructure investment plans of Modi’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The impact of the election on India’s climate policy might be less significant, for a number of reasons. First, other priorities regularly topped polls of voter concerns, notably inflation and unemployment, although this has evolved recently, partly due to increased instances of climate-induced physical impacts, from landslides to floods to severe crop losses. Second, both the BJP and its leading opponent, Congress, are strongly committed to India’s continued adoption of renewables, albeit via different means – with the challenger party promising in its manifesto a new green transition fund and more resources for India’s National Adaptation Fund. A third reason, which leads on from the first two, is that neither major party has been forced to properly address India’s biggest climate problem – vast and rising emissions from coal. Indeed, current policy is for domestic production to increase up to 2040 to reduce reliance on imports. Coal – and Modi’s close relationships with the controversial Adani Group – notwithstanding, the BJP’s record on solar and hydrogen investments, and fossil fuel subsidy reductions is impressive. But regardless of the make-up of the coalition, India’s next government will need to up the ante to have a hope of meeting even its existing climate commitments, such as installing 500GW of renewables, which will handle 50% of electricity demand, by 2030.

Down, not out – Support for climate-related resolutions at the AGMs of US firms has been closely watched this proxy season for further signs of a “stewardship depression” witnessed since 2021. But climate votes only tell part of the story, with a high number of social-themed filings also vying for investor backing. These include four shareholder proposals seeking more action and transparency on pay, working conditions and racial equity by Walmart, the world’s largest private employer. Prior to

Take Five: Twin Peaks

A selection of the major stories impacting ESG investors, in five easy pieces. 

Developed countries have belatedly reached a target for climate finance, only to be set a new one for nature.

Ten years after – It might have taken them a little more than a decade, but at last they got there. Developed nations mobilised US$115.9 billion of climate finance for developing countries in 2022, it was revealed this week, exceeding for the first time the US$100 billion annual level set in Copenhagen in 2009. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), last year saw a record 30% annual rise in climate finance, meaning the target – originally unveiled at COP 15 – was reached two years late. The total includes more than US$20 billion in attributable private finance, as well as bilateral and multilateral public sector funding, plus export credits. Importantly, adaptation finance accounted for US$32.4 billion of the total – three times the 2016 level. Discussions on a New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) on climate finance for the post-2025 period, which made little progress at COP28, should progress next week’s Bonn Climate Conference, where the agenda will also include carbon credits, adaptation finance and the Global Stocktake, ahead of COP29. In anticipation of the NCQG, the OECD released an analysis recommending use of public sector interventions to directly or indirectly finance climate action. But measures to support the goals of the Paris Agreement must now sit alongside those needed to realise the objectives of the Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF). At a Nairobi summit that concluded yesterday, the UN Convention on Biological Diversity called for investments of at least US$200 billion a year from all sources, and for reform of US$500 billion in harmful subsidies to achieve the GBF’s Goal D: invest and collaborate for nature. These and other recommendations will be discussed at COP16 in Colombia in October.

Gap analysis – A lack of progress on gender equality in the workplace has been underlined by the International Labour Organization (ILO) in a report reflecting fewer jobs and lower pay for women, especially in low-income countries. According to an update to the ILO’s annual World Employment and Social Outlook, the ‘jobs gap’ – which measures the number of persons without a job but who want to work – stands at 22.8% for women in low-income countries, versus 15.3% for men. This contrasts with a gap

BHP’s Carbon-Heavy Bid for Anglo-American

The Australian miner’s attempt to buy Anglo-American has been pitched as a copper deal, but would create a huge coal producer with emissions equivalent to a mid-sized country’s.

Mining giant BHP’s bid to acquire Anglo-American would create the world’s biggest shipper of metallurgical coal and a global mega-polluter, exposing shareholders to stranded asset risk as the world moves away from fossil fuels, a think tank has warned.

This is a particular danger if steelmakers solve the problem of decarbonising steel faster than BHP assumes, and if carbon capture, use and storage (CCUS) – which could extend the life of dirty blast furnaces – fails to take off, the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) said.

Australia-based BHP, the world’s biggest miner, offered to buy London-listed Anglo-American last month in an all-share deal that valued the company at £31 billion (US$39 billion). Anglo-American rejected the offer saying it was undervalued, but BHP is expected to increase its offer.

Most commentary has focused on the copper component of the proposed deal, a positive public-relations angle for BHP given the red metal’s central role in the clean energy transition.

But the deal would have a dirty side. Both companies have large metallurgical coal and iron ore divisions, supplying the carbon-spewing steel mills of China, India, Japan and South Korea. Steel is one of the world’s most polluting industries, producing around 8% of global carbon emissions.

Combining the two companies would result in annual emissions of around 490 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent a year, analysis of each firm’s 2023 annual reports shows.

That’s equivalent to the emissions of a mid-sized industrialised country (well above the UK’s total annual greenhouse gas emissions, and about level with notoriously high-emitting Australia). This enormous, hard-to-abate carbon footprint is set to be an ongoing ESG headache for the firm – even as it spins off or shuts down its dirtier mines.

Most of the companies’ emissions come in the form of Scope 3 – emitted by the miners’ steelmaking customers. In BHP’s case, Scope 3 emissions from iron ore represented an eyewatering 283 million tonnes last year (on par with Spain’s total emissions), and from its metallurgical coal about 29 million tonnes. Meanwhile, Anglo-American’s Scope 3 emissions from processing iron ore were 51 million tonnes.

Steelmaking coal still ‘essential’

Iron ore is not intrinsically carbon-emitting. The ore itself contains no carbon, and if alternative methods

Take Five: Coal in the Whole

A selection of the major stories impacting ESG investors, in five easy pieces. 

This week’s G7 commitment on coal will have insufficient impact without a global response.

Coal in the whole – The Group of Seven committed to phasing out unabated coal by 2035, but was criticised for allowing continued use of the fuel in power plants that deploy carbon capture technology, as well as for the flexible deadlines it gave to Japan and Germany. The announcement came in response to the COP28 pledge for all parties to transition away from fossil fuel usage. G7 countries said they would submit nationally determined contributions (NDCs) that “demonstrate progression and the highest possible ambition”, including 2030 targets and demonstrating alignment with net zero by 2050 goals. But the Turin communiqué offered precious little detail on the elimination of oil and gas from the energy systems of G7 countries. There has been some action at the individual country level, admittedly, with the US Environmental Protection Agency last week outlining requirements for coal and gas-fuelled plants to capture 90% of emissions, among other measures. While the G7 stressed its adherence to the International Energy Agency’s Net Zero by 2050 scenario, members are not fully aligned with its ban on new oil and gas exploration or development. G7 environment ministers also encouraged other countries to follow their lead on NDCs, and stressed their continued support for Just Energy Transition Partnerships. Given the latter are focused on effecting the clean energy transition of intensive coal users such as South Africa and Indonesia, it is likely that getting these stalled decommissioning initiatives back on track will have more impact on the decarbonisation trajectory than the domestic actions of leading economies. China, it should be noted, added the most coal capacity last year, followed by Indonesia and India.

Plastic progress? – The fourth round of UN-sponsored negotiations on the Global Plastics Treaty were hampered by an inability to agree on all-important production cuts. As a result, “intersessional work” will be needed if a final draft text is to be ready ahead of the last planned round of discussions in Busan in November. Most progress was made on developing a global approach to extended producer responsibility, but reports suggested developed countries fought shy of committing to binding targets for lower production levels. Prior to the talks, 160 financial institutions called for binding rules and obligations to address plastics’

Taxonomies are not Instruments of Industrial Policy

Christina Ng, Managing Director of the Energy Shift Institute says Asia’s transition finance complications could harm its climate goals.

Is transition finance an attempt to extend the spectrum of green finance? Or is it a covert means of financing non-green activities, which have had limited opportunity in gaining access to sustainability-conscious investors?

This phenomenon appears to be occurring in Asian markets.

And nowhere is this more apparent than in the realm of national financing frameworks, where the drive to foster economic growth is so strong that it can be pursued at the expense of transitioning to a genuinely green and sustainable energy future.

Recent developments underscore this troubling trend.

For example, Indonesia’s revamped Sustainable Finance Taxonomy incorporates certain new and existing coal-fired power plants as transition activities and therefore qualifies them for transition finance. The Indonesian government justifies this classification due to the role of coal power generation in processing critical minerals for electric vehicles and clean energy technologies – which aim to contribute to economic growth.

Flawed reasoning

This flawed reasoning not only perpetuates the reliance on fossil fuels but also risks alienating climate-minded foreign investors. Indonesia’s logic, if applied universally, would imply that any power plant, including fossil-fired ones, could be labelled transitional, simply because it powers the manufacturing of clean energy technologies.

Up in the northeast of the region, the government of Japan launched a Green Transformation (GX) policy. It aims to switch Japan’s fossil fuel-oriented industries to clean energy focused ones and issue sovereign transition bonds, among other instruments, to finance the GX plan. But a deeper dive reveals that the centrepiece of the government’s GX strategy is about ensuring economic growth.

This observation is also shared in a Sustainable Fitch note which found an emphasis on the term ‘competitiveness’. Specifically, the term was mentioned 15 times in the GX framework as compared to just once in Singapore’s green financing plan and not at all in India’s framework. The note goes on to say “this may explain why some of the eligible transition activities under Japan’s strategy are supportive of industry, but do not meet international green standards”. The questionable activities referred in Japan’s strategy include hydrogen, gas infrastructure, and ammonia co-firing in coal and gas power plants.

The approaches in Indonesia and Japan overlook the fundamental goal of sustainable finance – chiefly, to channel capital to activities that mitigate greenhouse gas emissions that would, in

EU Sparks Controversy on Energy Charter Treaty Drop

European Union will withdraw from ‘anti-green’ treaty on environmental grounds, but sources warn of impact on renewable investments.

The European Parliament’s vote last week to withdraw from the controversial Energy Charter Treaty has been interpreted as a near-certain ‘death blow’ to a decades-old agreement that is widely perceived as outdated and anti-green.

But the decision, which lawmakers say is necessary to protect the European Union’s climate policies against litigation from fossil fuel companies, may not be as positive for the energy transition as some believe.

James Rogers, an international arbitration lawyer and partner at law firm Jenner & Block, said the EU’s withdrawal – which he said left the treaty “dead” – could inadvertently harm the bloc’s green energy ambitions by reducing investor protections against policy changes.

Set up in 1994 in the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union, in part to open up gas imports from Russia and eastern Europe, the ECT provides energy investors with legal protection against the policy whims of national governments. Governments that expropriate assets or arbitrarily change rules may be taken to arbitration under the treaty. More than 50 countries across Europe and Asia have signed up to the treaty since, with Japan its easternmost member.

But as climate change became a key policy concern in Europe in subsequent years, the ECT progressively turned into a weapon for fossil fuel companies to fight against green policies that harmed their interests. It was under the ECT that German utilities RWE and Uniper, for example, sued the Dutch government for €2.4 billion over its plan to phase out coal-fired power back in 2021.

Critics say the threat of a legal challenge under the ECT alone has a “chilling effect” on green policy – which is real but difficult to quantify.

Some of its members pushed to modernise the framework. But these efforts largely failed, and a growing number of European signatories have already left or plan to leave the treaty, including the UK, France, Germany, Spain and Poland. The EU’s departure now turbo-charges that trend.

“Finally, the fossil dinosaur treaty is no longer standing in the way of consistent climate protection, as we no longer have to fear corporate lawsuits demanding billions of euro in compensation brought before private arbitration tribunals,” Anna Cavazzini, Member of the European Parliament and Rapporteur for the Trade Committee, said following the vote last week.

Not anti-green

According to